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MAKING UNFETTERED WAR POWERS 
COMPATIBLE WITH LIMITED 
GOVERNMENT 
THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 
9/11. By John Yoo.1 University of Chicago Press. 2005. xii + 
366 pp. $29.00 
Gordon Silverstein2 
War requires strong, centralized and efficient government. 
But that same sort of government is a conservative's worst 
nightmare when it comes to domestic policy. This has left con-
servatives with a stark constitutional conundrum, at least since 
the First World War: Must they sacrifice a commitment to lim-
ited government in order to play an essential world role? Or, 
conversely, must they sacrifice that world role to assure liberty 
and limited government at home? 
This dilemma literally exploded onto the American political 
agenda on September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of that crisis 
John Yoo-then a Deputy Assistant Attorney General-
contributed a series of memos articulating legal theories to sup-
port the Bush Administration's assertion of war and treaty pow-
ers. Having now returned to his position as Professor of Law at 
1. Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berke-
ley. AB Cornell University 1981; PhD, Harvard University, 1991. Professor Silverstein is 
the author of IMBALANCE OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1997) and the forthcoming HOW LAW KILLS 
POLITICS (W.W. Norton). 
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Berkeley's Boalt Hall, Y oo has written a comprehensive book 
attempting to construct a constitutional justification for this as-
sertion of extraordinarily broad Executive power and yet, at the 
same time, a theory that attempts to build barricades against the 
risk that this massive central power might blow back, and erode 
constitutional limits at home. 
Professor Yoo argues that properly understood, the Consti-
tution as written and ratified not only allows, but expects Presi-
dents to exercise a free hand in foreign lands, giving Presidents 
nearly unlimited powers in war, along with virtually uncon-
strained authority to interpret or even terminate treaties such as 
defense pacts with Taiwan, Anti-Ballistic Missile agreements, 
and the Geneva Convention Accords on the Treatment of Pris-
oners and the U.N. Convention Against Torture.3 But this very 
same Constitution, Yoo argues, limits the creeping spread of 
global governance and the risk it poses to limited government 
and individual liberty at home. 
Professor Yoo's theory rejects a reliance on original intent 
or meaning as expressed by the Constitution's authors, building 
a fairly open-textured "original understanding" of those who 
ratified the document in the States to support his view. It was 
this understanding, shaped by that generation's own experiences, 
education and cultural context that Y oo believes should guide us 
through the Constitution's more ambiguous phrases when it 
comes to war and foreign affairs. 
A thoughtful conservative scholar and professor, Yoo insists 
that the Constitution-at least in foreign affairs-has evolved in 
ways very much in keeping with the distribution of power those 
who ratified the Constitution might well have "anticipated" and 
well understood (p. 295). He frequently asserts these sorts of 
presumptions: "Struggle over the powers of war and peace 
would have remained at the center of the Framers' memories of 
British political history" (p. 46); "In considering the foreign af-
fairs power, the Framers would have looked to recent British po-
litical history as much as to intellectual thought on the separa-
tion of powers" (p. 45); and "a majority of the Framers probably 
3. Third Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The Fourth Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 46, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. HJ0-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113. The United States signed the Conven-
tion in April, 1988, and it was ratified on October 21, 1994. 
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believed that the President enjoyed a 'protective power"' 
(p. 100); to note just a few of many. 
Yoo's claim is that when it came to the powers of war, the 
framing generation (if not the framers themselves) "would have" 
understood the relationship of Congress and President "to mimic 
the British forms of government" (p. 65). Yoo makes a powerful 
case that the founding generation, steeped in English law and 
Parliamentary history and fearful of the anarchy threatening to 
disintegrate the young nation under its original charter of gov-
ernment, built a new government that would be able to confront 
these dangers. The answer they came up with, Yoo argues, was 
to recreate the relationship between King and Parliament. There 
are striking parallels-and Yoo does a service by pointing them 
out-but there are profoundly striking differences that he largely 
ignores. 
In England, the Crown alone decided on when to go to war, 
and how to fight. But this power was checked by Parliament's 
control of the purse strings. Therefore, Y oo concludes, since 
Congress today retains ultimate control of the purse-strings, and 
since (at least in practice) the Executive has assumed the initia-
tive in war powers and foreign policy, we should maintain this 
division of labor. 
There are two problems here. First, does this division of 
power accurately reflect the constitutional design? And second, 
was the allocation of powers he focuses on the means or the 
ends? In other words, was the division of initiative and finance 
the objective in this institutional design-or was that merely the 
means employed to balance the two branches of government? If 
it was the later, then our focus ought to be on maintaining this 
balance rather than any particular distribution of specific pow-
ers. 
Of course the founding generation could not escape its own 
experiences and education. Thomas Jefferson acknowledged 
that there were "some among us who would now establish a 
monarchy," but these people, Jefferson insisted, are "inconsider-
able in number and weight of character." Jefferson admitted that 
his own generation was "educated in royalism," but "our young 
people are educated in republicanism. An apostasy from that to 
royalism is unprecedented and impossible. "4 
4. Thomas Jefferson, letter to James Madison, March 15,1789. 
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Though they built their new government on old founda-
tions, the institutions they put in place were anything but the sort 
of replica Y oo asserts the ratifiers "would have" intended or 
embraced. As James Madison made clear in The Federalist No. 
37, the founding generation was painfully conscious of how in-
adequate were the existing models on which they might build 
their new system. All "the other confederacies which could be 
consulted as precedents" throughout human history had failed, 
Madison noted, and could "furnish no other light than that of 
beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, with-
out pointing out that which ought to be pursued. "5 The most the 
Americans could do, Madison insisted, was "to avoid the errors 
suggested by the past experience of other countries," and try to 
develop new institutions that might be as self-correcting as pos-
sible, that would "provide a convenient mode of rectifying" our 
own errors "as future experiences may unfold them."6 It seems, 
then, that though the Americans surely were influenced by the 
relationship of King and Parliament, they were consciously at-
tempting to develop new institutions and new institutional ar-
rangements. 
Y oo is right that the key congressional power was (and re-
mains) the power of the purse. And while the President is as-
signed the duty of Commander-in-Chief, it is Congress alone 
that is charged with the power to "raise and support" armies and 
navies; to tax and to spend. But why this arrangement? Why this 
division? Was the division of authority the end itself? That is the 
second part of the problem with Y oo's argument. The purse is 
still the most important and powerful weapon Congress has to 
fight off an aggressive President. But it is far less .potent and far 
less meaningful than was the Parliamentary purse. 
For one thing, the United States in 1789 had no standing 
army, and no taste for one either. It was in fact the lack of a 
large and mobile standing army that delayed American entrance 
into World War I, and again, a major problem in the months be-
fore the United States entered the Second World War. But 
thanks to the Cold War and a growing world role, the United 
States now has more than 1.4 million uniformed troops on active 
duty, 24-hours a day, 365-days-a-year, with nearly another mil-
5. DIE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison). 
6. !d. 
7. These themes are more fully explored in GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE 
OF POWERS: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY (1997). 
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lion active-reserves and spends more than $400 billion a year to 
supply and support those troops. This money can be cut off, of 
course, but not easily. Congress, Yoo blithely asserts, "can al-
ways cut off the funding for military adventures" by "simply re-
fusing to appropriate new funds or constructing offensive weap-
ons systems." This "effective check on the President's powers," 
Yoo approvingly concludes "renders unnecessary any formal 
process requirement for congressional authorization or a decla-
ration of war before hostilities may begin" (p. 294). 
It is one thing to assert that Congress can use the power of 
the purse to control foreign policy. That is certainly true. But 
this is not an easily targeted- or easily deployed-weapon. 
"Congress can simply defunct" weapons systems, or military ad-
ventures, Yoo asserts. They can in theory-but can they so easily 
in fact? Here Y oo skates over the critical factor political scien-
tists worry about all the time: power. 
There is a distinct difference between legal authority to cut 
funds (which Congress unquestionably retains) and the ability 
actually to exercise that power. Yoo certainly is right that Con-
gress has the authority to "use its power of the purse to counter 
presidential warmaking" (p. 152); that Congress has the author-
ity to "cut off the funding for military adventures" (p. 294); and 
that Congress has the authority to stop wars "merely by refusing 
to appropriate the funds to keep the military operations going" 
(p. 13). But authority is not effective power. Does Congress ac-
tually, credibly have the ability to use this overwhelming 
weapon? It is important for legal scholars to decide who has 
what formal legal authority, but if we are looking at an evolving 
set of institutions, as Yoo insists we must when it comes to for-
eign policy, then we must consider not only the weapons each 
branch brings to the battle, but their ability to use those weapons 
effectively.8 
We should "keep in mind the distinction between two 
senses in which the word power is employed," Richard Neustadt 
wrote in 1960. One sense is when it is used "to refer to formal 
constitutional, statutory or customary authority" and the other is 
in the "sense of effective influence on the conduct of others. "9 
8. Yoo endorses a living constitution when it comes to foreign policy. Modem 
practice in foreign affairs, he writes, falls "within the bounds set by the constitutional text 
and structure." And he finds "that the constitutional text and structure provide far more 
flexibility to the president and Congress than has been commonly understood" (p. 10). 
9. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN 
PRESIDENTS 321 n.3 (Free Pressed., 1990) (1960). 
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Harry Truman's famous musing about the frustration former 
General Dwight Eisenhower would feel when he took over as 
President illustrates this well. "He'll sit here," Truman said of 
Eisenhower, "and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will 
happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it 
very frustrating. "10 
What was the purpose of the allocation of power in 1789? 
Was it simply a lawyerly exercise in dividing an estate, assigning 
specific duties to each branch and then leaving it to those parties 
to negotiate adjustments in these assignments? Or, was it meant 
to structure and maintain a balance of power between the 
branches? If the latter, then the ways in which Congress has be-
come less able to wield this weapon is critical- and clearly out of 
keeping with the original understanding as well as the original 
intent. 
Does Congress have the authority to cut off funds in the 
middle of a war? Yes. But can Congress do so? Does it have the 
power to do so? Consider what only recently befell Jack Murtha, 
Member of Congress from Pennsylvania when he suggested that 
the United States begin to curtail its involvement in Iraq in No-
vember, 2005. This 37-year career Marine Corps Officer, and 
holder of two Purple Hearts, a Bronze Star and a Distinguished 
Service Medal from the Marine Corps was accused, on the floor 
of the United States House of Representatives, of being a traitor 
to his country- by another Member of Congress. And while 
Representative Jean Schmidt (R-OH) quoted a constituent who 
wanted Murtha to know "that cowards cut and run, and Marines 
never do," and House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) said 
Murtha and his Party "want us to wave the white flag of surren-
der to the terrorists of the world." 11 
The Vietnam War is another case on point. The famous 
Tonkin Gulf resolution was used by Presidents Johnson and 
Nixon as a clear endorsement of their management of the war. 
When Congress finally repealed the Act, in June, 1970, it made 
no difference at all. Nixon continued to pursue the war for an-
other three years, while Members tried to cut off funds. They 
were unable to do so for three years. But not for lack of will, but 
rather because of an institutional feature that Yoo ignores. 
10. /d. at 9. 
11. Steven Thomma, Murtha Mirrors District on Iraq, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 
20, 2005, at A19. 
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It takes just a simple majority to hand power to the presi-
dent-but to take it back almost certainly will require a veto-
override. In other words, there is a powerful ratchet effect 
here-it requires 50-percent plus one to give power away, but 66 
percent is required to get it back again. Does this change the fact 
that Congress has the formal authority to stop a war with the 
power of the purse? No. But it certainly changes our understand-
ing of their ability to use that power. Congress faces not only in-
tense political constraints on its ability to use this power, but in-
stitutional limits that no King or Parliament ever "would have" 
or ever "could have" recognized. 
For many, John Yoo's name has become synonymous with 
torture. This is both fair, and unfair. It is unfair since Yoo surely 
does not advocate torture, but it is fair since it was his legal work 
that laid the constitutional justification for the Bush administra-
tion's declaration that the Geneva Accords on the Treatment of 
Prisoners would not apply to non-uniformed combatants cap-
tured in the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, or for that 
matter, anywhere in the world. It was his work again that was re-
lied upon by the Administration in justifying its reinterpretation 
of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment. 
The Powers of War and Peace makes no mention of tor-
ture, save an oblique reference in the preface. But it very clearly 
lays out a constitutional theory to justify the President's unilat-
eral decisions on the applicable treaties and conventions. In es-
sence, Y oo argues, the President alone has a virtually uncon-
strained power not only to negotiate treaties, but to interpret 
them, and abrogate them at his discretion. 
"Treaties represent a central tool for the exercise of the 
President's plenary control over the conduct of foreign policy," 
Yoo writes, and "in the course of protecting national security, 
recognizing foreign governments, or pursuing diplomatic objec-
tives, the President may need to decide whether to perform, 
withhold, or terminate U.S. treaty obligations" (p. 184) He in-
sists that this conclusion is bolstered by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit's ruling in a dispute over President 
Carter's decision to abrogate the American defense treaty with 
Taiwan in order to advance relations with the People's Republic 
of China. And Yoo is quite right about the Appeals Court's rul-
ing. He focuses on the finding in this case- a victory for the 
President. He does not, however, pay much attention to the Su-
preme Court's ruling in this case. As a matter of law, that may be 
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fine, but as a matter of constitutional interpretation, it's a prob-
lem. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court dismissed the case, 
a number of Justices took the extraordinary action of filing opin-
ions. 
In his suit, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) insisted that 
the Senate has a constitutional right to a role in treaty termina-
tions. The Appeals Court ruled that though Goldwater had 
standing to sue, the President was within his constitutional au-
thority. But not because of a prerogative power to terminate 
treaties, but mostly because the treaty in question lacked any 
sort of specific termination clause calling for a Senate role. In 
other words, the Senate had failed to reserve for itself a role in 
treaty termination. More important, the Appeals Court sug-
gested, was the fact that the Senate as a body had made no effort 
to assert that right since Carter's decision. In essence, the Ap-
peals Court held that the Senate had the political weapons it 
needed to fight Carter's decision, but had chosen not to use 
them. Thus the court would not do what the Senate was unwill-
ing to do for itself. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justices split, and or-
dered the suit dismissed, but failed to arrive at any clear ration-
ale.12 Justice Powell's opinion, however, emphasized that the 
case was not "ripe." The Senate, he argued, had not acted and 
therefore there was no actual case or dispute between the 
branches. Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Burger and Blackmun ar-
gued that the suit should be dismissed as a political question, 
while only Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the case was 
ripe, and justiciable, and that the President did indeed have the 
constitutional authority to do what he had done. 
Justice Powell insisted that the Court would not rule in dis-
putes between the President and Congress "unless and until each 
branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority" 
but "if the President and the Congress had reached irreconcil-
able positions," then the Court would have "to provide a resolu-
tion pursuant to our duty 'to say what the law is."'13 This suggests 
far greater constitutional ambiguity in the treaty clause then Y oo 
perceives. If Yoo's primary objective in this book were simply to 
outline a constitutional defense of Executive power in war and 
12. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See also the more extensive discus-
sion in the lower court consideration of this case, Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 
(D.C. Cir. 1979). 
13. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996, 1001 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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foreign policy, this book would have been easier to write, and a 
bit easier to read. There would be much more to debate in his 
historical interpretation, in his selective reading of some of the 
key precedent cases and in his blithe assumptions about what the 
founding generation "would have" or "could have" understood. 
But Yoo's ambition, and concern, is wider than just the scope of 
the war power. 
Yoo seems convinced that he has resolved the great conser-
vative conundrum, finding a way to read the Constitution 
broadly in foreign policy, and yet protect domestic politics from 
the dangers inherent in big, efficient and central government. 
This dilemma, which has bedeviled conservatives at least since 
the First World War, was first articulated by a Republican Sena-
tor from Utah who would later go on to serve on the U.S. Su-
preme Court. 
America's belated and ill-prepared entry into World War I 
provoked George Sutherland to struggle with this dilemma first 
on the floor of the U.S. Senate/4 later in a collection of lectures 
he gave at Columbia University after leaving the Senate (and 
published in 1918, shortly before the end of the war),15 and then 
in a series of Supreme Court cases in which then-Justice Suther-
land articulated a doctrine of strictly limited power in domestic 
affairs, and a very broad, centralized power in foreign policy. 
Sutherland insisted that Americans had only three options 
for the future. They could simply abandon the Constitution as 
hopelessly out of date and inadequate to deal with modern di-
lemmas. They could stick with the traditional constitution, 
strictly limiting the role of government across the board, and 
abandon any role in world affairs. Or they would have to find a 
way to read the same Constitution narrowly at home, and 
broadly when it came to foreign policy. 
Sutherland had a chance not only to articulate a theory that 
might accomplish this last option- but he seized the opportunity 
to write it into law when Warren G. Harding put Sutherland on 
the U.S. Supreme Court. A few years later, in United States v. 
14. GEORGE SU1HERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF 1HE 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 61417 (2d Session, 1909) (hereinafter, SU1HERLAND, 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL], later published as The Internal and External Powers of the Na-
tional Government, 191 N. AM. REv. 373 (1910). 
15. GEORGE SU1HERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS AND WORLD AFFAIRS 
(1919) (hereinafter, SU1HERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS]. 
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Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation,16 a case that is often quoted, 
and rarely studied, Sutherland did just that. 
Curtiss was a case about delegated powers-could Congress 
delegate discretionary power to the President to cut off arms 
sales to belligerents in a border fight between Paraguay and Bo-
livia? The Curtiss-Wright company not only challenged the dele-
gation, but also argued that the national government lacked con-
stitutional authority to suspend their sales of machine guns and 
planes to either country (or, as it happens, to both). 
Sutherland, one of the "Four Horsemen" of the Supreme 
Court devoted to federalism and actively employing the com-
merce and contract clauses of the Constitution to fend off gov-
ernment interference with individual liberty in general, and the 
expansion of the national government into the states' sphere in 
particular, faced a real dilemma. To say the Constitution would 
not permit the national government to act in foreign affairs 
would be to essentially abandon any hope the U.S. might have of 
playing an effective world role. But, to say the national govern-
ment had this broad power might fundamentally undermine the 
very limits Sutherland insisted on in domestic cases ranging from 
Carter v. Carter Coal to Schechter. 17 
"The question which does arise is startlingly simple and di-
rect," Sutherland wrote in his book. "May the power be exer-
cised by governmental agency at all? A negative answer to this 
question in any given case, it will be seen, might be of the most 
serious consequence .... Any rule of construction which would 
result in curtailing or preventing action on the part of the na-
tional government in the enlarged field of world responsibility 
which we are entering, might prove highly injurious or embar-
• ,,18 
rassmg. 
Historian Walter LaFeber argues that this dilemma "was 
perhaps the central problem challenging the Constitution as the 
United States became a global power between the 1890s and 
1920."19 
Curtiss-Wright was Sutherland's answer: The Constitution, 
he insisted, was to be read differently in foreign and domestic af-
16. 299 u.s. 304 (1936). 
17. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
18. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, supra note 15, at 20-21. 
19. Walter LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Inter-
pretation, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 51 (David Thelan ed., 1988). 
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fairs. Foreign policy powers are sovereign powers, Sutherland 
wrote, and since sovereignty is and must be indivisible, those 
powers passed whole and intact from the national government of 
Britain (King and Parliament) to the national government of the 
United States-first to the Continental Congress and then to the 
national government under the Constitution- Congress and the 
President, together. Domestic power, by contrast, passed from 
King and Parliament to the separate states. The states, in turn, 
then delegated specific, limited and enumerated domestic pow-
ers to the national government. 
Even for Sutherland, foreign policy powers had limits. And 
while the authority of Congress together with the President's 
own powers were broad and deep, Sutherland insisted that they 
"like every other governmental power, must be exercised in sub-
ordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. "20 
But how to prevent this strong national power in foreign af-
fairs from coming home? Sutherland's theory depended on a 
critical firewall, a clear constitutional barrier. And it relied upon 
a vigilant patrol to protect that barrier. This seemed quite plau-
sible in 1936, with the Supreme Court steadfastly deploying the 
Commerce and Contract clauses to block any excess national 
power from eroding federalism and individual liberty. But just 
one year later, in 1937, the barrier was breeched, and the firewall 
punctured. 
Sutherland's solution couldn't even outlast his own tenure 
on the Court. But that has not stopped conservatives from con-
tinuing to struggle to find a way to solve this dilemma. Far from 
disappearing, the problem has taken on new dimensions in the 
post-Cold War world of globalization. "Just as nationalization 
created a demand for regulation of the economy at the national 
20. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 321. Though Sutherland is regularly cited as doc-
trinal support for a theory of prerogative war powers for the President, his earlier writing 
and lectures suggest that his concern really was national power (Congress and President 
together) and not prerogative powers for the President. In his earlier lectures and the 
published versions of these talks, there is clear evidence that Sutherland saw a far more 
limited role for the President. "The war powers, with the exception of those pertaining to 
the office of Commander-in-Chief, are vested in Congress," Sutherland wrote in 1910, 
"and that body must exercise its own judgment with respect to the extent and character 
of their use. The advice and counsel of the President should be given great weight, but 
the acceptance of the President's recommendations must be the result of intelligent ap-
proval and not of blind obedience." SUTHERLAND, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, supra 
note 14, at 76, cited and discussed in Roy Brownell, The Coexistence of United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurispru-
dence,16 J.L. & POL. 1,17 n.37 (2000). 
360 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:349 
level," Yoo writes, "so too globalization has increased the need 
for regulation at the international level" (p. 301). 
A national government empowered to conduct foreign af-
fairs is also a national government empowered to bind the coun-
try and its people to international commitments and obligations 
that might erode sovereignty, and subject individual citizens to 
the long reach of international regulatory regimes, rules and laws 
over which they might have very little if any control. These risks 
range from resource allocations to pollution limits; from the 
threats of international criminal law to international restrictions 
on the use of capital punishment by state courts. As Yoo puts it, 
the "problems of globalization have prompted the formation of 
international institutions designed to coordinate a multilateral 
policy solution. As these international institutions increase in 
number and authority, they will place increasing pressure on the 
Constitution's structures for democratic decisionmaking and ac-
countability" (p. 299). 
Under John Yoo's theory this problem is even more acute 
since he staunchly defends not only broad national power, but 
nearly unfettered Executive power in war and foreign policy. 
How then to guarantee that a President constitutionally empow-
ered in this way can't easily exercise these vast powers to enter 
into agreements that will open America and Americans to the 
risks of global regulation? 
Professor Y oo spends the first half of his book articulating a 
strong, vibrant, living constitution, and assigning virtually unlim-
ited powers to the President. How then to prevent that muscular 
White House from entering into all sorts of international agree-
ments that might bind Americans and sacrifice their sovereignty 
whether over trade, environmental regulation or international 
criminal proceedings? 
The answer for Yoo is the Treaty Clause-again, properly 
understood. The Treaty Clause is part of Article 11-the Execu-
tive Powers. Yes, treaties require the advice and consent of two 
thirds of the U.S. Senate, but it is an Executive power, meaning 
the President has the power to negotiate treaties; the power to 
interpret them, and, Y oo insists, the power to abrogate them at 
will, and without Senate or House participation. Over time, a 
second instrument has emerged-congressional-executive 
agreements. These are simple statutes, requiring a simple major-
ity vote in each house. Each has its advantages, and they have 
been largely used as convenience and efficiency dictated. 
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But that's the problem-and the solution, Yoo says. Unlike 
the war powers, where he embraces "current practice," here Yoo 
insists on far more technical precision. Treaties are still required 
where the nation is making broad commitments overseas to po-
litical and military agreements. But where international agree-
ments will have direct domestic effect, Yoo says, Congress must 
be involved. Without enabling legislation, Presidents cannot do 
by treaty what they otherwise would need a statute to accom-
plish. This would include trade agreements, regulations concern-
ing fuel emissions, or health standards, the jurisdiction of inter-
national criminal courts, or any obligation that will require new 
taxes, for example. 
This seems a neat and clean line. But it's not. The line be-
tween classic politico-military agreements and international ob-
ligations with direct domestic effect are fast eroding in our global 
age. This would mean, therefore, that Yoo has created his own 
power-ratchet: Binding the nation and its people to agreements 
with direct domestic effect will be exceedingly hard, since it will 
require both a treaty (with its Senate super-majority) and con-
gressional enabling legislation. But getting out of these agree-
ments will be exceedingly easy, since Yoo has already made 
clear that his understanding of the Constitution cedes to the 
President the exclusive power to abrogate treaties. George Suth-
erland would be proud. 
But has Yoo really solved the great conservative conun-
drum? Can we really bifurcate the Constitution, bolstering for-
eign policy power without the risk that this very same power 
might blow back and undermine individual liberty at home? The 
evidence suggests that we cannot. 
Both Sutherland and Y oo share a sincere concern for indi-
vidual liberty. This is the root of their desire to cabin national 
power. But the problem is that artificially splitting the Constitu-
tion into a document of broad foreign policy powers assigned to 
the national government (Sutherland) or the President (Yoo) ac-
tually exposes us to a far more dangerous threat to liberty- it is 
the danger that these extraordinary, extra-constitutional powers 
in foreign policy can, will, come home to undermine civil liber-
ties. In fact, they already have done so. If a President enjoys un-
checked power in foreign affairs to assure national security, if, as 
Yoo says, we should assume that the Constitution was designed 
to produce "the most effective exercise of national power neces-
sary to achieve those foreign policy objectives" (p. 20), then 
what is to prevent a President from asserting that national secu-
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rity abroad requires (and empowers the Executive) to violate 
civil liberties at home? 
This isn't a hypothetical. It's already happened. First, and 
most prominently, during the Nixon administration. And now, 
some fear, it is happening again in the open, through statutes 
like the Patriot Act, and in secret in ways we will only find out 
about years from now. 
Richard Nixon had no hesitation in asserting that national 
security abroad constitutionally expanded his power at home. In 
· a 1977 interview, Nixon claimed the Constitution authorized the 
President to break the law. As Nixon put it, "when the President 
does it, that means that it is not illegal." If the President, Nixon 
added, "approves something because of the national security ... 
then the President's decision in that instance is one that enables 
those who carry it out, to carry it out without violating a law. 
Otherwise they're in an impossible position. "21 
This argument was actually advanced in court, in a 1971 
case called U.S. v. Smith, where Nixon Administration lawyers 
insisted that the President, acting through his Attorney General, 
"has the inherent constitutional power (1) to authorize, without a 
judicial warrant, electronic surveillance in "national security" 
cases; and (2) to determine unilaterally whether a Biven situation 
is a matter within the concept of national security. The court re-
jected these claims, and ordered the government to surrender 
the transcripts of their surveillance to the defendant. But the 
point is to suggest that far from being the post-hoc rationaliza-
tion of a President forced to resign his office, these were very 
much the work product of the Justice Department in 1971-and 
they are no less likely to be the sorts of arguments the current 
Justice Department is offering today. And while the courts re-
jected these arguments in the early 1970s, will today's courts, 
heavily staffed by the George W. Bush administration, see things 
the same way? 
The problem here is that John Yoo, like Sutherland be-
fore him, is attempting to find a way to split a unitary Constitu-
tion in two. But that is a dangerous task, since the Constitution is 
a delicate machine, designed to work as an integrated whole. If 
the machine is unable to cope with modern conditions, then we 
really should tear it down and build a more appropriate device. 
As Thomas Jefferson noted, we should not look at Constitutions 
21. Richard Nixon, interview with David Frost, May 19, 1977. 
22. United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424,426 (C.D. Ca. 1971). 
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"with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of 
the covenant, too sacred to be touched. "23 
But before we call a new constitutional convention, we 
should remember that the "doctrine of the separation of powers 
was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote effi-
ciency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. "24 And, 
indeed, as Justice William 0. Douglas wrote, we "pay a price for 
our system of checks and balances, for the distribution of power 
among the three branches of government. "25 If that price seems 
too exorbitant, if September 11 has dramatically altered our na-
tional values and priorities, then we need a new Constitution. 
But we should not be trying to force a bifurcated Constitution 
out of a unitary and balanced system of government. We end up 
undermining the system as it was designed, as it was meant to be, 
and as it was and ought to be understood. 
23. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, quoted in 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 367 (1996). 
24. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
25 .. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,633 (1952) (Douglas, J., 
concurnng). 
